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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
oF· THE STATE OF UTAH 
lJC>S ~ ~LD \\' J Ll~E.~l.SON, ~· 
Plmntzfj, Appellant, 
YS. Case No. 
( 10858 
.JOH~ \Y. TURNER, \Varcle11, ) 
i ·tali ~tate Prison, 
Defendant, Respondent 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S'LATE.\IEN'l' OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Donald \Vilkerson, was convicted 
11f the crime of third degree burglary in the District 
Court of the Second .Judicial District, Davis County, 
~..;ta te of LT tah. From this conviction an appeal was 
taken. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah up-
held the cotffiction. The instant appeal is from a denial 
of plaiu~iff\ petition for habeas corpus seeking his re-
1 
lease from confinement in the Utah State p . 
. Tison 01 reason of the 1udgment and commitment d · 
or er a . 
result of the burglary conviction. ~ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
Appellant filed his petition for writ of habea 
S COi'· 
pus in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County 
State of Utah on October 24, 1966. On December ~1 
1966, a hearing was held before the Honorable Brvan· 
II. Croft, District Judge. The court entered its me~or. 
andum decision denying appellant's petition on Febru. 
ary 9, 1967. 
On March l, 1967, appellant filed a Notice oi 
Appeal from the court's decision. 
STATE1\1:ENT OF FACTS 
Respondent essentially agrees with the statemeni 
of facts as presented in appellant's brief, but wishe1 
to point out that the question of whether or not appellant 
had waiYed his right to counsel in the interrogation 
conducted in Jerome, Idaho, is one of the questions to 
be decided by this appeal. 
Therefore, respondent objects to the statement on 
page 4 of appellant's brief that appellant was ques.: 
tioned "without being properly represented by counsel. 
2 
POINT I 
"~FPELLANT 'VAS IN NO WAY PRE-
.J t JHCED BY THE REFUSAL OF THE 
1_ LdI ::/L'ATE SCPREIVIE COURT TO AP-
poJX'i' A SECOND ATTORNEY FOR THE 
p L'HPUSE OF 1\SSISTING HEVI IN HIS AP-
\ ~'~"-~L \\'HEX THE RECORD SHO,VS THAT 
THE UHIGIXAL APPOINTED ATTORNEY 
coL-LD Fl:\D NO J\IERITORIOUS GROUNDS 
FOR _\PPEAL. 
Respondent readily admits that the requirements 
. ; th:· :)ixth .. \mendment can only be satisfied when an 
,'z:d1.-,ed h:t; been afforded the opportunity to retain 
c(Junsel t\1 assist him in his defense. In addition to the 
-:uleguard of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution 
r: the State of Utah, art. I,§ 12, specifically states that: 
"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
haYe the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel." 
It seems clear that the United States Supreme 
l'mrrt has extended this right to include the post-con-
-, ,ction stage as well as preliminary and trial stages in 
a crimillal prosecution. In Dougla.s v. California, 372 
P.S. 363 ( 19t)3), the United States Supreme Court 
J1nalidated a system whereby the intermediate appellate 
court would examine the merits of a proposed appeal 
hv an indigent com-icted of a crime. If the court found 
'olllc' merit to the appeal it would appoint counsel to 
rqJresrnt the accused and assist him in his appeal. If 
3 
no meritorious points were found the court would , . ~~ 
appomtments of counsel and the accused wa , ll , 
S a O\\'t1l 
to prosecute the appeal pro se. The Suprem C 
e our: 
held that such a system violated the right of an , · 
accuse1i 
to the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourt eentl1 
Amendment .. Mr. Justice Douglas stated: 
"In spite of California's forward treatm 
1 f. · d' t d · en o m igen s, un er its present practice the t, 
of an appeal a person is afforded in the Dist~P.~ 
Court of Appeal hinges upon whether or not ;c 
f h 
. hl 
can pay or t e assistance of counsel. If he can 
the appellate court passes on the merits of hii 
case only after having the full benefit of writter
1 
briefs and oral argument by counsel. If he can-
not the appellate court is forced to prejudge the 
merits before it can even determine whether 
counsel should be provided." Id. at 355-56. 
In so stating, the court agreed with the position 
taken by Justice Traynor of the California Supreme 
Court who said that: 
"Denial of counsel on appeal [to an indigent! 
would seem to be a discrimination at least at in-
vidious as that condemned in Griffin v. Illi-
nois . ... '' People v. Brown, 55 Cal.2d 64, 71,3ji 
P.2d 1072, 1076 (1960) (concurring opinion). 
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 ( 1956), the Unitea 
States Supreme Court held that a state may not grant 
appellate review in such a way as to discriminate againsl 
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty. 
The question in issue was the right of an indigent to a 
free transcript on appeal. In both the DougW.s case ano 
4 
(iri7]1,1 case tlic eYil was the same, discrimination 
,1 ,ai 11 st the indigent. 
(-(1 
Fr•mJ tiie'>e tases it is readily apparent that an in<li-
,'-' .~ ,~ ch~1ded to the same protection as that accorcle<l 
:, (:'(Jernlant of means. 
Tue sLtutes of Utah and court pronouncements mt 
i 11 , .~u ·let ;iemonstrate that this state has recognized 
L!K r1gi1t of an al'.cused to counsel at preliminary and 
~'i:'.i ~tuµ,e:-i as well as post-conviction proceedings. Utah 
~·(J(t'. , . 1lrl. ;· 77-L:J-1 ( 1953) states: 
.. \ Yhe11 fre defendant is brought before the 
11utg·1slra t e Ll pon an arrest, either with or without 
a \\·arr;lt1t, 011 a charge of having committed a 
1J~;h]w offense triable, or on information or in-
1:1c1cmc1t, t~1e magistrate must immediately in-
il'l·m him of the charge against him and of his 
right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the 
proceeding.'' 
Tu c'.!.i-; the Ctah State Supreme Court has added: 
'·The preYr1iling opinion correctly indicates 
that the right to have the assistance of counsel 
at ewry stage of the proceedings includes the 
rigl1t to counsel at the arraignment, at the pre-
'.im:uary hearing and at all subsequent proceed-
ings." State v. Braasch, 119 Utah 450, 4G4, 229 
P.2cl :280, :295 (1951) (concurring opinion). 
Respondent agrees that the Constitution of the 
~ '1iited States as well as the Constitution and case law 
rd' the State of Gtah extend to an accused the right to 
cuun'icl in all proceedings as one of the fundamental 
5 
rights of all citizens. The case of State v. Hine 
6 
r· . 
' . . . s, uta. 
2d 126, 307 P .2d 887 ( 1957) is especially appro . 
l 'l'l U h Pria\. iere. ie ta Supreme Court stated at 6 lTtah .
11 
131, 307 P.2d 891: .i, 
"The privilege of an accused to the assi'st· 
f 1 · h antt ? counse is one of t e fundamental rights. 
11 
1s more than empty form; it means the right 
1
' 
a reputable member of the bar who is williJ 11 
and in a positi~n to honestly and conscientiou.:fi: 
represent the mterests of a defendent and · 
present such def eris es as are available to hrni 
under the law and consistent with the ethics r 
the profession." (Emphasis added.) !! 
Appellant in the instant case had appointed ti
1 
represent him in his appeal a member of the bar w!\1
1 
considerable experience and reputation in handlini 
criminal matters. Nowhere does appellant claim thai 
.Mr. :M:itsunaga did not honestly and conscientious!)· 
represent his interest. The fact is that after a thoroug~ 
examination of the trial transcript Mr. Mitsunaga cou!J 
not find any meritorious issues upon which, in hi~ 
opinion, the case could be reversed. Certainly, an attor· 
ney cannot be required to do more. If no defenses w 
available to him under the law he cannot be required 
to manufacture such defenses just to please his client. 
To do so would certainly not be consistent with thr 
ethics of the profession. 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court 
in Ellis v. U.S., 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958), stated in:1 
per curium opinion: 
6 
"If counsel is convinced, after conscientious 
inyestigation, that the appeal is frivolous, of 
course, he may ask to withdraw on that account. 
If the court is satisfied that counsel has dili-
gently investigated the possible grounds of ap-
peal, and agrees with counsel's evaluation of the 
case, the leave to withdraw may be allowed and 
leave to appeal may be denied." 
See also Hardy v. U.S., 375 U.S. 277 (1964). 
Tile instant case bears marked resemblance to 
Staumorc v. People, 157 Colo. 207, 401 P.2d 829 
( 19G5) In that case the conviction of Stanmore for 
robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery had been 
affirmed on a pro se appeal. Stanmore v. People, 146 
Colo. 41415, 362 P .2d 1042 ( 1962), cert. den. 368 U.S. 
993 ( 1962) . Stanmore then petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus contending that he had been denied the 
right to counsel on his appeal. The Supreme Court of 
Colorado ordered the trial court to appoint counsel for 
him with the instruction that the appointed counsel be 
directed to examine the trial record to determine whether 
any reversible error had occurred during the trial which 
had not been presented on appeal. Counsel was also 
directed to examine the briefs to determine if the 
matter~ raised on appeal had been adequately presented. 
He was then to submit a brief in support of any matters 
not brought before the court in the appeal. After exam-
ination of the record and the appeal briefs, counsel 
concluded that no additional grounds for an appeal 
were present and that all points had been adequately 
7 
presented. In upholding the conviction the c ·t ou1 sl·i' 1 
at 157 Colo. 209, .:1<Ql P.2d 830: '' 1tl 
:'The matter having been presented t .. 
tlus light by the brief of the competent 
0
, Us 1'1 . i couml 
appomtec pursuant to order of this cou ·t 1. 
dl t d • . J, I\[ now a iere o our ec1s10n as reported in S't 
P l . '1111. more v. cop e, supra. It is our firm cou · ·t· 
ti t 1 '} . 1· f , \JC11111 1~1 w u e me igent c ef eudants convicted 
111 
· .. 
crime are certainly entitled to haYe counsel ,, ' 
poi~ted a~ ~tate expense to represent them",~'.: 
renew, [ c1tmg Douglas 'l'. California], they ;in 
not entitlec~ to r~qu.ire the state to searci1 for 
counsel until one is found who will contend tlw 
there was error in the trial. 
"This is in contrast to the rule which demanrh 
that everyone be afforded counsel at his trrnl. 
At the trial. the issue is guilt or innocence, an,! 
the determination of the issues must, bv consti 
tutional right, be by a jury. On review, hoicem. 
the issue is not guilt or innocence, hut whet/11, 
errors of law have been committed which u:a1T1w 
reversal of the conviction. 'Vhen an able laww1 
appointed by the state, after conscientious ~wl 
diligent investigation, determines that 1111 
grounds of error exist, the defendant may1 o! 
course, continue to prosecute his writ of error. 
but not, in our view, with counsel paid for O) 
the state." (Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Burrell, 96 Ariz. 233, 393 P.2d 9Zl 
( 1964), defendant, after having been comicted ol' 
escape and robbery, requested appointment of counsel 
to assist him in his appeal. Counsel was appointed a1111 
after searching the record reported to the Arizorn: 
Supreme Court that he 1rns unable to find grounds for 
8 
I 
appeal. In accordance with an Arizona statute which 
requires the court to search the record for fundamental 
error in all criminal appeals, the court ordered the rec-
ord submitted. After reviewing the record, the court 
,tfi'irmed the conviction stating at 96 Ariz. 235, 393 
P.2d 923: 
"The counsel appointed by the court has acted 
as an advocate for the defendant, and not as 
amicus curiae. 'Ve are satisfied that he has made 
a conscientious investigation, and agree with his 
conclq.,sion that there are no grounds for a 
successful appeal." 
~ee abo, People v. Tabb, 156 Cal. App.2d 467, 319 
P.2d 656 ( 1957) ; State v. Ortiz, 98 Ariz. 65, 402 P.2d 
H ( 196.5); Richardson v. Willard, 241 Ore. 376, 406 
P.2d 156 (1965). 
The similarities between the instant case and the 
Burrell case are readily apparent. In both cases a com-
petent and experienced attorney was appointed to repre-
sent the appellant. In both cases the attorney could· 
find no meritorious points for appeal and communicated 
his conclusion to the court. Finally, in both cases the 
court had an opportunity to review the record. In the 
instant case that opportunity was afforded by appel-
lant's pro se appeal. State v. Wilkerson, 17 Utah 2d 
353, 412 P.2d 312 ( 1966). The Utah Supreme Court 
after examining the brief submitted by appellant and 
studying the record found the appeal to be without 
merit and affirmed appellant's conviction. 
9 
Respondent, therefore, submits that appell 
. d . . . ant liao 
.t equate counsel to aid m his appeal and th· t · 
a it \1·1 
not the duty of counsel to manufacture point :'. 
• S to Iii 
subn11tted for appeal. Appellant was in no .. 
. . , >\a~ pr, 
1ud1ced by the Utah Supreme Courts refusal to, . appo1111 
subsequent counsel. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT 'VAS ADEQUATELY I\. 
FORl\IED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
AND HIS RIGHT AGAINST SELF'-INCRDll. 
NATION AND NO PREJUDICE RESi!LTED· 
FRO~I THE ADl\IISSION OF TESTDIOXY 
OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF JERO)IE 
IDAHO. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has see1 
fit to limit the effect of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 L.S 
.J.36 ( 1966) , to cases in which the trial began after 
I 
June 13, 1966. The constitutional requirements ~et 
forth in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964),ari 
to be effective in trials beginning after June 2:2, lDIJJ 
.Johnson v. New .Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). There·i 
fore, the effect of the Miranda decision has no bearin~ 
on the arrest and interrogation of appellant and di" 
cussion of the constitutional requirements of Mirandn 
are unnecessary to the decision of the instant case. 
The constitutional requirements of Escobedo, how· 
ever, are applicable to the arrest and interrogation ol' 
appellant and if the admissions of appellant made lo 
10 
the Jerome City Police Chief are to be considered ad-
missable iu appellant's trial, the constitutional require-
ments of Escobedo must have been met. 
490: 
In Escobedo the Supreme Court said at 378 U.S. 
·'VVe hold, therefore, that where, as here, the 
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into 
an unso!Yed crime but has begun to focus on a 
particular suspect, the suspect has been taken 
into police custody, the polic~ carry out a pro-
cess of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting 
incriminating statements, the suspect has re-
quested and been denied an opportunity to con-
sult \vith his lawyer, and the police have not 
eff ectivelv warned him of his absolute constitu-
tional right to remain silent, the accused has 
been denied 'the assistance of counsel' in viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion as 'made obligatory upon the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 37~ U.S. at 342, and that no statement 
elicited by the police during the interrogation 
may be used against him at a criminal trial." 
The crucial question in the instant case is whether 
or not the principles set out in Escobedo were met at 
the interrogation of appellant. It is clear that when 
appellant was taken into custody and before any ques-
tioning was attempted, he was informed that he did 
not have to make any statement and that anything he 
did say could be used against him. He was also told 
that he had the right to consult an attorney. During his 
trial the following exchange took place between appel-
11 
lant's attorney and Chief Yingst of the J . 
I> eroine lrl , olice Department: ' Ui11 
"Q. [By 1\ilr. Stratford] 'Vhen ~·ou , . t 
tl . ·1 ' ·•en u . ie .Jal , when you were there and t lk d Piu 
did vou tell him he had the right t;
1
g.e to huu, stat~ment whatever? ive you n" 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you tell him he had the right to co 
1 an attorney ? nsu r 
A. Yes, I did. And I told him right there. 
Q. And you also told him, did you not, that am , 
statement he gave, of course, you could ' . t } . l U.\t agams um. 
A. That's right, I did. 
Q. Do you know if he had an opportunity 1
11 
obtain counsel? 
A. I don't know. He said, 'I don't want u;
1
, 
attorney' the day I talked to him. 
Q. He didn't want an attorney? 
A. That's right." 
(Ex. P-9 at 57). 
From this it can be seen that appellant was in· 
formed of his rights at the time of his arrest and 1m 
afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel, which he 
rejected, choosing instead to make an admission of the 
burglaries in Idaho and Utah in order that he might he 
returned to Utah for trial. (Ex. P-9 at 49). It is true 
that appellant later secured the services of an attorne1 
and before his questioning in the Jerome Jail requestea 
that his attorney be present. His attorney stated that 
12 
he did '"not necessarily" wish to be present at the q ues-
tioning. (Ex. P-9 at 62-63). Appellant had already 
made statements implicating himself in both the Utal1 
and Idaho burglaries after being informed of his con-
stitutional rights. When told that his attorney did not 
wish to be present he knew at that time from the pre-
rious statements by the interrogating officers that he 
did not have to make any further statements and that 
he could insist that his attorney be present or could 
ilbtain another counsel. Appellant voluntarily chose to 
continue and make further admissions; in so doing, he 
waiYed his right to object to the absence of counsel. 
Respondent, therefore, submits that appellant was 
adequately informed of his rights at the time of his 
:irrest and that he knew of his rights at the subsequent 
,1ucstioning that took place in the Jerome City Jail. 
His failure to insist that his counsel be present was a 
rnlid voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. All of 
the requirements of Escobedo were met and appellant 
was afforded all of his constitutional rights. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT VIOLATED THE CONDI-
TIONS OF HIS CONDITION AL TERMIN A-
TION BY REMAINING IN UTAH AFTER 
HIS RELEASE FROM PRISON AND PARTI-
CIPATING IN A BURGLARY AND HIS RE-
TURN TO UTAH TO FACE CHRGES WAS A 
VOLUNTARY DECISION. 
13 
The Board of Pardons has been invested . 1 . W1tn \Ii 
duty to determme the conditions under whicl · 1 
• . 1 u1n1ath 
may be released from pnson on parole or I .. 
la\ e then 
sentences terminated. Utah Code Ann ; ... ,. 
. ~ I 1-U·!.' 
( 1953) . It has been held by the U tab Suprein C ·' 
e oun 
that the Board of Pardons has plenarv pow . t 
" er o ~t' 
the conditions under which a termination of c t , ,,eu euet 




tion that prisoner agree to leave the state is not uii co11. 
stitutional as amounting to a banishment. Man.1c/i .. 
Turner, 14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P.2d 294 (1903). Sec 
also, In re Cmnmarata, 341 .Mich. 528, 67 N.W.2d 6i; 
( 1954), cert. den. 349 U.S. 953 ( 1955). 
All prisoners released on parole remain in Jeg:ii 
custody and are subject at any time to being returne1I 
to the prison and their release voided until such time :h 
sentence is terminated. The Board of Pardons is girelt 
full power to retake and reimprison any comic! on 
parole. Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-16 ( 1953). In McCo," 
t'. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d 721 (1945), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a parolee is still in legal 
custody and control of the Board of Pardons em 
though outside the prison walls and the Board has the 
power to revoke parole without affording the prisoner 
any hearing. 
The terms of appeallant's release required that hr 
depart immediately from the State and not return for 
anv purpose. (Ex~ P-1) Appellant was released on 
N ~vember 10, 1964, but chose to ignore the conditiom 
14 
of bis release and remained in Utah at least long enough 
tc participate in a burglary on November 22, 1964. Re-
nwining in Utah for that length of time constituted a 
riolation of his release agreement wherein he agreed to 
leave Ctah immediately. This violation was sufficient 
to warant the revocation of conditional termination even 
111 the absence of any other violations. 
Furthermore, appellant's return to Utah was 
roluntary. It is true he faced charges in Idaho, but he 
rnluntarily chose to return to Utah to face the charges 
made against him here. He knew that in returning he 
1 iolated his conditional termination. He could have 
:iroided the possibility of revocation by remaining in 
Iclaho and facing the charges made against him there. 
ffhether the revocation of his conditional termination 
•1·as based upon his failure to leave the state immediately 
after his release or upon his return to the state to face 
criminal charges is immaterial. Under the power given 
to the .Board of Pardons to set conditions for termina-
tion of sentence and the power to retain custody over 
a released prisoner, the Board could have validly re-
rnked the termination order for either reason. 
It is submitted, therefore, that appellant violated 
the terms of his conditional release and the Board acted 
within its statutory powers in revoking appellant's con-
ditional termination of sentence. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's contentions on appeal are totally 
without merit. No case exists for reversal or dischar e 
of appeallant from incarceration. Therefore, respon~. 
ent submits that the judgment of the District Court 
denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas c0rpus 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84-114 
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